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undisclosed and often underappreciated
events that have shaped U.S.-Iranian
relations. This masterfully researched
historical account focuses on U.S.Iranian relations since the fall of the
shah of Iran and the beginning of the
Iranian Revolution. The policy and strategy decisions of the past six U.S. presidents, covert CIA operations, Iranian
actions and reactions, and the struggle
to create the present-day U.S. Central
Command are all detailed in this book.
David Crist works as a historian for the
federal government and as a frequent
adviser to senior government and
military officials. He is also a colonel in
the Marine Corps Reserve and a veteran
of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. His
research for this work included interviews and access to records of many
of the principal decision makers on
both sides. The Twilight War comes
at a critical time in the relationship
between the United States and Iran.
If plotted on a graph, the thirty-year
chronology of events between the United
States and Iran would look like two opposing synchronized sine waves: when
one is up, the other is down, and never
the two shall meet. Crist’s engaging
account provides never-before-revealed
insights into the near, and often missed,
opportunities for reconciliation between
both countries. In what could sometimes
pass for a Sophoclean tragedy, if not
for the very real consequences, these
two opposing nations cannot seem to
get in step long enough to find ways
to resolve their standing grievances.
Some readers may criticize Crist’s lack
of detail on the complex history of
Iran during the reign of the Americansupported shah. Crist explains his
decision to pick up the story of U.S.Iranian relations at the time of the
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Iranian Revolution on the grounds that
these are the years of direct conflict and
competition with Iran. It is clear that
this decision allows for a more focused
examination of the current regime, as
well as the events that are currently
shaping our world. Those interested in
prerevolutionary U.S.-Iranian relations
may wish to read Stephen Kinzer’s All
the Shah’s Men (Wiley Press, 2008).
General James Mattis has made The Twilight War required reading for members
of the U.S. Central Command staff. This
insightful and intellectually provocative book should be required reading
in fact for all military professionals
who wish to gain a better understanding of what many in the profession of
arms consider the most likely reason for
military conflict in the next decade.
daniel dolan
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Smith, Jean Edward. Eisenhower: In War and
Peace. New York: Random House, 2012. 951pp.
$40

When you mention Dwight David
“Ike” Eisenhower, far too many people
will hark back either to D-Day and the
invasion of Normandy or to a mythical,
almost lyrical presidency, when life was
good, three martinis accompanied every
lunch, and gas cost pennies a gallon.
The truth, of course, is far different and
far more interesting. In Eisenhower Jean
Edward Smith has produced what may
well be the best one-volume biography
on this figure. The book moves fast
and yet manages to leave nothing out.
In illuminating Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Smith steps adroitly and rapidly through
the years of his life, maintaining the
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reader’s interest and never shortchanging
his subject. It is a bravura performance.
For example, Smith moves through
Eisenhower’s childhood at a gallop,
while fully describing a family that was
centered on a domineering, distant, and
hot-tempered father but made bearable
by the love and efforts of his mother, Ida.
Eisenhower’s rise in the Army also
speeds by, but not without explanation
of the critical importance of Fox Conner,
Ike’s steadfast mentor and advocate;
George Patton, who became a trusted
friend and fellow missionary of armored
warfare; and Douglas MacArthur, who
both recognized and used Eisenhower’s
talents in Washington, D.C., and in the
Philippines. Ike’s rise to prominence in
the late 1930s and early 1940s as an exceptional staff officer is well chronicled,
as is his progressively improving ability
to lead combined forces, once given
major command in North Africa and
Europe. Almost before the reader knows
it, Eisenhower has invaded Europe, arranged for the liberation of Paris, been
surprised by the Germans in the Battle
of the Bulge, and terminated the war.
He then becomes the first commander
of NATO and the chancellor of Columbia University. Ike’s campaign and two
terms in the White House flow by at an
equally fast pace, leading to his retirement from office and a final move to
the farm at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.
Ike’s transition from military leader to political candidate to president is as surely
and speedily dealt with. Smith lays out
the major issues of the day and in so doing reminds the reader that Eisenhower,
far from pursuing a presidency of golf
and leisure, dealt with major domestic
and international issues throughout his
term in office. Ike was less than kind to
Richard Nixon, although readers may
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find it difficult to muster much sympathy for the vice president. The two men
were of vastly different temperaments
and capabilities, and Eisenhower made it
clear he thought Nixon was not of presidential caliber. However, part of
Eisenhower’s antipathy might have
stemmed from the fact that Nixon, with
the brilliant success of the Checkers
speech, forced Eisenhower to report
earnings he would rather have kept private.
Smith awards Eisenhower full points
for the handling of the Suez crisis of
1956. He depicts a world leader in his
prime, a president who is savvy, decisive,
and powerful. The reader is reminded
that his stand on Suez was as much
about principle as it was about power.
If, however, there is one portion of the
book that truly stands out as the best
part of an exceptional work, it is the
recounting of how Eisenhower handled
Arkansas governor Orval Faubus’s
refusal to desegregate public schools as
directed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Topeka. Eisenhower
the man, while in no way a racist by the
standards of his day, was not one to challenge southern apartheid or other racial
inequities. However, Eisenhower the
president was different. He had taken the
oath of office, and the Supreme Court
decision made clear where his duty lay.
Faubus refused to fulfill his gubernatorial responsibility to provide order and
safety, so Ike stepped in, federalizing the
Arkansas National Guard and ordering
elements of the 101st Infantry Division to Little Rock. Equally credible
was the manner in which Eisenhower
refused to accept delays in desegregating the military, something for which
he is routinely given too little credit.
In this excellent biography Smith
also takes a major, and unfortunately
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deserved, swipe at the late Stephen
Ambrose. Ambrose, long accepted as a
leading scholar on Eisenhower, was
found to be guilty of plagiarism in
some of his later works; as Smith
points out, Ambrose also fabricated
accounts of meetings between himself
and Eisenhower, meetings that simply
did not occur. The failure of Ambrose
stands as a stark reminder as to the
fallibility of historians and the need to
get the history right. This Smith does.
His scholarship is meticulous, and his
book is a worthy addition to any shelf.
richard norton
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Berman, Larry. The Life and Times of Admiral
Elmo Russell “Bud” Zumwalt, Jr. New York:
HarperCollins, 2012. 528pp. $29.99

Larry Berman has written a scintillating
biography of the man who is credited
with changing the U.S. Navy more,
perhaps, than any other single individual
in its history. Zumwalt was controversial in his day, and Berman found
during his research that feelings about
the admiral, both positive and negative,
still run strongly nearly forty years after
his tour as Chief of Naval Operations.
His book, although clearly written from
an advocate’s viewpoint, captures the
essence of why Admiral Zumwalt was
such a polemic figure during a time
of great social and political turmoil,
both inside and outside the Navy.
Berman crafts a comprehensive picture
of a highly complex individual who was
driven as much by his heart as by his
keen intellect. Zumwalt’s strong social
conscience enabled him to perceive
what most did not—a navy that was
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fundamentally racist and sexist, a navy
that inflicted innumerable injustices
on its sailors under the assumption
such practices were needed to ensure
discipline among the rank and file. As
Berman found, few of Zumwalt’s contemporaries were his intellectual equals,
particularly when it came to understanding the magnitude of the Soviet naval
threat that confronted the United States
in the 1970s. Berman makes clear that
Zumwalt’s reward for attempting both to
change the Navy’s force structure and to
eliminate its abusive personnel policies
was pushback by many of its most senior
officers, who felt he was pushing too
hard and going too fast. While Zumwalt
saw a lack of accountable leadership, his
critics saw a man hell-bent to destroy
many of the Navy’s most cherished
traditions. To most junior officers and
junior enlisted he was a godsend, who,
unlike most senior enlisted and older
officers, understood the difficult conditions under which they served. Berman
paints a vivid picture of the social issues
and grievances that were not simply
demeaning to the young sailors who
manned the Navy but also threatened
the service’s ability to man its ships
and squadrons once the all-volunteer
force replaced the Vietnam-era draft.
Berman also provides his readers with a
riveting account of Admiral Zumwalt’s
troubled relationships with President
Nixon and National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger. Nixon held Zumwalt
personally responsible for the race riots
that broke out in three ships, blaming him for allowing lax disciplinary
standards that, in his view, had led to
the problems. Kissinger is portrayed as
a self-interested political scientist who
was willing to put the nation’s security at grave risk in order to achieve
an ill-advised arms-reduction treaty.
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